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Abstract 
 
This dissertation was written as part of the L.L.M in Transnational and 
European Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law at the 
International Hellenic University.  
The key question this thesis will address is whether corporate 
settlements do indeed achieve real deterrence and deliver justice. Before 
settlements are rolled out across the globe in an uncritical manner, the lessons 
from the US experience and the emerging UK experience need to be heard and 
learnt. This thesis will also examine the need for global best practice standards 
on settlements to ensure that settlements are indeed effective and do indeed 
deter corruption.  
Taking first lessons from the US and emerging criticisms of the use of 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non Prosecution Agreements, the thesis 
will then look at the UK Deferred Prosecution Agreement regime built on judicial 
scrutiny. It will go on to look briefly at the trend towards out of court settlements 
in Europe before drawing some conclusions as to what global standards for 
corporate settlements are required. 
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Preface 
As more and more countries use out of court mechanisms or alternative 
resolutions to resolve foreign bribery and corruption cases and others 
contemplate the introduction of such mechanisms, it becomes increasingly 
important that the international bodies monitoring enforcement of corruption 
take stock and assess whether these mechanisms are likely to deter bribery 
effectively, and deliver a just outcome. 
The 2015 Conference of State Parties for the UN Convention Against 
Corruption has already called for the inter-governmental working group on asset 
recovery to gather information regarding the use of settlements and  “to analyze 
the factors that influence the differences between the amounts realized in 
settlements and other alternative mechanisms and the amounts returned to 
affected states with a view to considering the feasibility of developing guidelines 
to facilitate more coordinated and transparent approach for cooperation among 
affected States and effective return.”  
This thesis will highlight how imperative it is that the OECD Working 
Group on Bribery, which monitors implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, conducts in tandem with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC)’s efforts to analyze settlements in relation to UNCAC, or as part of a 
separate exercise, an assessment of the effectiveness of settlements and seeks 
to establish some global principles or best practice standards for settlements. 
The support and guidance I received from my supervisor Prof. Dr. Em. 
Athanasios Kaissis was decisive for my study of the educational material 
disposed to me and the final form of this dissertation; therefore I would like to 
express my gratitude for his honest interest and kind support. Moreover, I could 
never forget to acknowledge Mr. Karolos Seeger, who taught the elective 
course of Financial Crime, for inspiring me and providing his assistance.  Lastly, 
I would like to thank A.G for providing me with unfailing support and continuous 
encouragement through the process of researching and writing this thesis.  
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Introduction 
Corporate settlements are increasingly becoming the preferred tool for 
dealing with economic crime by large corporations, particularly in the fields of 
bribery and corruption. In its 2014 Foreign Bribery Report, the OECD found that 
69% of foreign bribery cases were dealt with by way of a settlement.1 
 The US, which has long been seen as the most proactive enforcer of the 
OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention, has led the way in this regard. Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements and Non Prosecution Agreements have become the 
“mainstay of white collar criminal law enforcement” in the US.2 Between 2004 
and 2012, the US resolved 70 out of 84 criminal enforcement actions under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act through either a Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
or a Non Prosecution Agreement.3 Only two Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
cases involving corporations since 2004 have resulted in a full court trial.4  
Many countries are now following the US trend, at a time that these 
settlements are becoming increasingly controversial in the US. The UK 
introduced Deferred Prosecution Agreements in February 2014 after having 
used civil recovery orders as a means of corporate settlement for overseas 
corruption for some years. Brazil introduced a provision for corporate leniency 
                                                 
1 OECD, “OECD Foreign Bribery Report: an analysis of the crime of bribery of foreign public 
officials”, December 2014, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecd-foreign-bribery-report-
9789264226616-en.htm    
2 Lanny Breuer, speech to New York City Bar Association, 13 September 2012, 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-lanny-breuer-speaks-new-york-
city-bar-associatio    
3 The others were resolved by way of a plea bargain. Mike Koehler, “Measuring the impact of 
Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Enforcement”, 49 U.C. Davis Law Review 497 (2015). Koehler does not include the BAE 
enforcement action as this was for a non-FCPA charge. The World Bank/StAR report “Left Out 
of The Bargain: Settlements in Foreign Bribery Cases and Implications for Asset Recovery”, 
October 2013, p 19 (http://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/9781464800863.pdf) lists the 
US as having entered into 187 settlements for foreign bribery and related offences since the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention came into force in 1999. This may include civil settlements with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission as well as criminal settlements with the Department 
of Justice and that may explain the discrepancy with Koehler’s figures.    
4 Ibid.   
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agreements in its 2014 anti-bribery legislation, the Clean Company Act – a 
provision which allowed a two thirds reduction in penalty for companies that 
cooperate with authorities, admit wrongdoing, and help identify those involved in 
it.5 It is still in the process of making such agreements more lenient.6  
Settlements have also been used to resolve foreign bribery cases in 
Germany, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Japan and Greece.7 And several countries are looking at whether to introduce 
some form of settlement procedure. 
There is no doubt that settlements offer a quick, cheap and relatively 
easy way of bringing an enforcement action. In their favor, settlements appear 
to be a win-win solution for prosecutors and corporations. The company 
receives a punishment, so the prosecutor has a result which may not be 
expedited through the court system, particularly with regard to complex financial 
crime.8 The company avoids the collateral and reputational damage of a 
conviction. As one US commentator put it: “all of the punishment, none of the 
guilt”.9 
Furthermore, settlements bring in easy money. The US Treasury has 
received $48.6 billion in fines from corporate settlements since 2000.10 In an era 
                                                 
5 Brazil previously used these agreements for competition offences. Their use in the current 
Petrobas scandal has caused controversy with Brazilian prosecutors questioning whether they 
are in the public interest.   
6 In December 2015, Brazil’s president Rousseff signed in a new provision for corporate 
leniency agreements which would remove the need to be the first to self-report an offence, or 
for an admission of guilt, exempt companies from debarment, and exempt companies that are 
the first to self-report an offence from any financial penalty whatsoever   
7 World Bank/StAR, “Left Out of The Bargain: Settlements in Foreign Bribery Cases and 
Implications for Asset Recovery,” 2014, 
http://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/9781464800863.pdf    
8 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-21/has-it-become-impossible-to-prosecute-
white-collar-crime-.     
9 Eugene Illovsky, “Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements: the Brewing Debate”, Criminal 
Justice, Summer 2006, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/cr
imjust_cjmag_21_2_corporatedeferred.authcheckdam.pdf    
10http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2015-Year-End-Update-Corporate-Non-
Prosecution-Agreements-and-Deferred-Prosecution-Agreements.aspx    
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of limited public resources, turning enforcement of financial crime into a cash 
cow is obviously an attractive policy option for both enforcement agencies and 
government.  
However, under the UN Convention Against Corruption, state parties 
must endeavor to ensure that discretionary legal powers for prosecuting 
corruption “are exercised to maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement 
measures in respect of those offences and with due regard to the need to deter 
the commission of the offence” (Article 30, para 3). Settlements obviously 
represent one such discretionary legal power.  
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CHAPTER 1: Lessons from the U.S 
1.1 Rationale of the Deferred Prosecution Agreements 
 
The use of corporate settlements in the US context needs to be seen in 
the context that 97% of all criminal cases in the US justice system – not just in 
relation to corporate crime - are resolved by way of plea bargaining, with only 
3% going to a full trial. Corporations are also able to plea bargain, and where 
they do so this is sometimes referred to as a criminal settlement or resolution.11 
Plea agreements are written negotiated agreements between a prosecutor and 
a defendant, which are accepted, modified or rejected by a court, in which a 
defendant pleads guilty often in exchange for a particular sentence or the 
dismissal of certain charges.12 Plea agreements in effect lead to a conviction.  
While the Department of Justice (DOJ) still enters into plea agreements 
with companies, in recent years it has turned increasingly to “alternative 
resolution vehicles”, in the form of Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non 
Prosecution Agreements to deal with corporations. Under a Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement (DPA), a defendant is required to admit relevant facts, 
pay a fine and commit to certain remedial measures in exchange for charges 
being withdrawn. A DPA usually lasts for a set period of time (usually around 3 
years) and is technically subject to court approval. A Non Prosecution 
Agreement (NPA) is a similar agreement to a DPA but no criminal case is filed 
before a court. In the context of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the 
DOJ also uses a hybrid type of enforcement action involving a guilty plea by a 
subsidiary (usually foreign) and an NPA or DPA with the parent company.13 The 
                                                 
11 World Bank/StAR, “Left Out of The Bargain: Settlements in Foreign Bribery Cases and 
Implications for Asset Recovery,” 2014, p 32 ff, 
http://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/9781464800863.pdf    
12 OECD Working Group on Bribery, ”Phase 3 report on Implementation of the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention in the USA”, October 2010, p 32 http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti- 
briberyconvention/UnitedStatesphase3reportEN.pdf    
13 Mike Koehler, “Measuring the impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement”, 49 U.C. Davis Law Review 497 
(2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2701836    
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DOJ also enters into civil settlements with companies. In addition, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) uses cooperation agreements, DPAs and 
NPAs to resolve civil cases under the FCPA and under US securities laws and 
regulations.  
The use of DPAs has helped the US achieve an impressive enforcement 
record in the context of the FCPA. Between 2004 and 2014, the US DOJ 
brought 84 enforcement actions under the FCPA. This compares with 24 
enforcement actions between 1977 and 2004.14 This has been at a time that 
few other OECD countries have brought any enforcement actions whatsoever.  
However, the use of DPAs and NPAs has become controversial within 
the US judiciary, the legal and academic communities, and the public. Some 
argue that such agreements do not offer meaningful punishment of 
corporations, that the fines they impose can easily be assimilated as a cost of 
doing business. Use of these agreements has rendered companies, in 
Professor Brandon Garrett’s words, “too big to jail,”15 and as such, fail to 
achieve justice.  
Others argue that DPAs and NPAs represent an ‘over-reach’ by 
prosecutors, who effectively bully corporations into whatever terms they want, 
particularly by asking for waivers of legal privilege. For these people, such 
agreements represent an abuse of power or as the Economist put it, “extortion 
behind closed doors.”16  
A significant number of critics have started to argue that the use of DPAs 
and NPAs for corporations undermines the US justice system itself. The 
Financial Times has described their use in the US to deal with banks implicated 
in the financial crash of 2008 as “the most blatant expression of the failure to 
rein in the financial industry.”17 
                                                 
14 Ibid.   
15 Brandon L Garrett, Too Big To Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014.   
16Economist, “The Criminalisation of American Business”, 30th August 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21614138-companies-must-be-punished-when-they-
do-wrong-legal-system-has-become-extortion      
17 FT View, “Misbehaving banks must have their day in court”, 19th April 2015, 
https://next.ft.com/content/f26a9acc-e515-11e4-a02d-00144feab7de    
  -7- 
DPAs were originally used in the US to deal with minor offences by 
juveniles and first time offenders. One of their stated aims was to protect “the 
vulnerable in society”, particularly juvenile and first-time offenders charged with 
certain non-violent crime, by helping offenders rehabilitate without having a 
criminal record hanging over them.18 As US Judge Sullivan observed in an 
October 2015 judgement, “at this time however, deferred prosecution 
agreements ... are used more proportionately more frequently to avoid the 
prosecution of corporations, their officers and employees.”19  
Use of DPAs and NPAs by the US DOJ went from 2 or 3 a year in the 
early 2000s to an average of 28 a year from 2006 onwards.20 From 2010 to 
2013, two thirds of the US DOJ’s Criminal Division corporate cases were 
resolved by DPAs or Non Prosecution Agreements (NPAs).21 2015 saw the 
resolution of 100 such agreements (87 Non Prosecution Agreements and 13 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements).  
 
 
 
                                                 
18Sullivan, https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2014cr0066-45;   Kristie Xian, 
“The Price of Justice: Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the Context of Iranian Sanctions”, 
6/1/2014, Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy; Peter Reilly, “Justice Deferred 
is Justice Denied: We must end our failed experiment in deferring corporate criminal 
prosecutions”, 7/16/2015, Brigham Young University Law Review.    
19 https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2014cr0066-45    
20 Public Citizen, Justice Deferred: the use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-
Prosecution Agreements in the Age of “Too Big to Jail”, July 8 2014   
21 Corporate prosecutions in the US continue to be used extensively in relation to environmental 
and antitrust offences where DPAs are rare. Some have argued that corporate prosecutions 
overall have declined significantly, by a third, between 2004 and 2014 (see 
http://src.bna.com/ZS ). Other research suggests that the rise in the use of DPAs and NPAs has 
led to a corresponding rise in plea bargains with corporations leading to “an overall increase in 
the reach of corporate criminal enforcement”, see Cindy Alexander and Mark Cohen, “Trends in 
the Use of Non-Prosecution, Deferred Prosecution and Plea Agreements in the Settlement of 
Alleged Corporate Criminal Wrongdoing”, April 2015, Searle Civil Justice Institute, Law and 
Economic Centre, George Mason University School of Law. 
http://masonlec.org/site/rte_uploads/files/Full%20Report%20-%20SCJI%20NPA-
DPA%2C%20April%202015%281%29.pdf    
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1.1.1 AVOIDING THE CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY  
 
The shift towards using DPAs primarily to deal with corporate economic 
crime goes back to the collapse of accounting firm, Arthur Andersen. Andersen 
was indicted and then convicted in 2002 on obstruction of justice charges for 
destroying documents in the run up to Enron’s collapse that same year. 
Andersen is frequently cited as an example of how a corporate conviction is 
effectively a death sentence for the company, leading to the loss of jobs of 
innocent employees, and financial disaster for innocent shareholders. 
Andersen’s conviction resulted in the loss of its certified public accounting 
license and thereby its ability to audit public companies.  
In response to criticism for being instrumental in Arthur Andersen’s 
collapse, the US Department of Justice’s Criminal Division has turned to 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements or Non Prosecution Agreements to deal with 
economic offending by companies, particularly large companies, since 2002. 
DPAs and NPAs effectively insulate a company from the collateral 
consequences of a conviction (the most important being potential debarment 
from government contracting) and helps reduce its reputational damage.  
However, the main justification for the roll out of DPAs – helping 
companies avoid the corporate death penalty - is not backed up by the 
evidence. Andersen was already potentially in a financially precarious position, 
after its profitable consulting wing split off in 2000, when it was indicted, and the 
firm had been struck by a series of scandals relating to its accounting practices 
that had seriously damaged its reputation.22 Andersen’s collapse following 
indictment meanwhile appears to be the exception rather than the rule. 
Markoff’s research in the US suggests that the “Arthur Andersen factor” is much 
exaggerated and that between 2001 and 2010 not a single publically traded 
company failed as a result of a conviction. Even DOJ officials have started to 
recognize that corporate death is not inevitable. In March 2014, US Attorney, 
Preet Bharara dubbed companies, which claim that their business will fall apart 
if tough enforcement action is taken against them as a “Chicken Little routine” 
                                                 
22 Wall Street Journal, “Arthur Andersen’s fall from grace is a sad tale of Greed and Miscues”, 
7th June 2002, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1023409436545200    
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that “begins to wear thin” because prosecutors have found that “in reality, as we 
had suspected, the sky does not fall.”23 Despite this, the Andersen example and 
the threat of the corporate demise as a result of prosecution continues to be 
cited as a key reason for the necessity of DPAs and corporate settlements both 
in the US and abroad. 
 
1.1.2 ACHIEVING THE SAME OUTCOME AS A CONVICTION WITHOUT THE 
COST OF A TRIAL  
 
Another key motive behind the roll-out of DPAs by the DOJ is the simple 
fact that prosecutors can get the same outcome in terms of financial penalties, 
admissions, corporate cooperation and remedial action as they can be achieved 
by a conviction or a guilty plea but without the costs of investigation and 
prosecution. Lanny Breuer, former assistant Attorney General and head of the 
US Department of Justice’s Criminal Division, for instance said in a 2012 
speech that DPAs have “the same punitive, deterrent and rehabilitative effect as 
a guilty plea.”  
Some evidence suggests that companies do potentially receive higher 
monetary penalties under a DPA than a plea bargain (though NPAs tend to 
involve a lesser financial penalty), and that DPAs include more non-monetary 
sanctions, such as the imposition of a corporate monitor and the waiver of 
attorney-client privilege.24 Critics however point out that because DPAs and 
NPAs insulate companies from the collateral and reputational consequences of 
having a criminal conviction, the overall financial impact of a DPA or NPA may 
not be as great as a plea bargain, and their deterrent value is lower.  
Furthermore, if DPAs are used almost exclusively to resolve financial 
crime, prosecutors may lose “the expertise to try [such cases] in a courtroom in 
                                                 
23http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/speech/sifma-s-compliance-and-legal-society-annual-
seminar-prepared-remarks-us-attorney     
24Cindy Alexander and Mark Cohen, “Trends in the Use of Non-Prosecution, Deferred 
Prosecution and Plea Agreements in the Settlement of Alleged Corporate Criminal 
Wrongdoing”, April 2015, Searle Civil Justice Institute, Law and Economic Centre, George 
Mason University School of Law, http://masonlec.org/site/rte_uploads/files/Full%20Report%20-
%20SCJI%20NPA-DPA%2C%20April%202015%281%29.pdf     
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a way that makes sense to jurors.”25 Law professor Rachel Barkow points out 
that “at some point you do have to be willing to take down a company to prove 
that you are serious about enforcing the law.”26 If prosecutors have lost their 
expertise to ‘take a company down’, using settlements for corporate crime will 
ultimately, critics argue, have diminishing returns in terms of deterrence. 
 
1.1.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM  
 
Additionally, prosecutors argue that through DPAs and NPAs, they can 
get valuable corporate governance changes from companies. In his 2012 
speech, Lanny Breuer argued that the use of DPAs had had “a truly 
transformative effect ... on corporate culture across the globe.”27 His successor, 
Leslie Caldwell, went further when she told the OECD Working Group on 
Bribery in Paris in 2014 that DPAs allowed prosecutors to “impose reforms, 
impose compliance controls, and impose all sorts of behavioral change that a 
court would never be able to impose following a conviction at trial.”28  
Some have questioned whether prosecutors should be acting as 
regulators, by imposing corporate reform, when corporate governance is not 
their competence and when their primary purpose is to prosecute misconduct - 
not to regulate. One former prosecutor describes the use of DPAs as replacing 
“our criminal justice system ... with a quasi-regulatory regime administered by 
prosecutors.” Others have pointed out that most corporate governance reforms 
that are included in a DPA or NPA can as easily be achieved through a plea 
bargain.29  
                                                 
25 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-21/has-it-become-impossible-to-prosecute-
white-collar-crime-   
26  http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444772804577621780469137056    
27http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-lanny-breuer-speaks-new-york-
city-bar-association     
28http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/assistant-attorney-general-caldwells-unconvincing-defense-of-
dpas-npas     
29http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/assistant-attorney-general-caldwells-unconvincing-defense-of-
dpas-npas;  Gabriel Markoff, “Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: 
Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century”, University of Pennsylvania Journal 
of Business Law, 5/3/2015, vol 15:3    
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1.1.4 ENCOURAGING COMPANIES TO SELF-REPORT  
 
In the FCPA context, DPAs and NPAs are used to incentivize companies 
to self-report wrongdoing and cooperate with law enforcement. Given that 
foreign bribery offences are by their very nature secret, with much of the 
evidence that would be needed for a conviction potentially in multiple 
jurisdictions some of which may refuse to cooperate, incentivizing companies to 
come forward to report their own wrongdoing is a major motivation behind the 
global roll-out of the use of DPAs.  
Some have claimed recently that the majority of FCPA violations are 
revealed through self-disclosure.30 Others claim that fifty percent of FCPA 
enforcement actions result from voluntary self-disclosure.31 Research in 2010 
showed that of 40 FCPA enforcement actions between 2002 and 2009, 15 were 
based on voluntary disclosures, while 19 involved companies that did not self-
disclose.32  
In 2009, then assistant attorney general, Lanny Breuer, told a conference 
that: “the majority of our cases do not come from voluntary disclosures. They 
are the result of pro-active investigations, whistleblower tips, newspaper stories, 
referrals from out law enforcement counterparts in foreign countries, and our 
Embassy personnel abroad among other sources.”33 It is obviously in the 
interests of the DOJ to give the impression that companies will be detected if 
they do not self-disclose their wrongdoing in order to provide the incentive for 
                                                 
30 Matthew Stephenson, Global Anticorruption Blog, 
http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/03/27/do-companies-benefit-from-self-disclosing-fcpa-
violations/    
31 Mike Koehler, Q&A regarding the Uncomfortable Truths and Double Standards of Bribery 
Enforcement, February 16th 2015, http://fcpaprofessor.com/category/voluntary-disclosure/    
32 Four were disclosed through mergers and acquisitions, while two cases (Siemens and KBR) 
were treated as their own category. Bruce Hinchey, “Punishing the penitent: Disproportionate 
Fines in Recent FCPA Enforcement and Suggested Improvements,” Public Contract Law 
Journal, Vol 40, p 393, 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1650925    
33 Lanny Breuer, Prepared Address to 22nd National Forum on the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 17th November 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/111709breuerremarks.pdf    
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them to do so. The decision in early 2015 to triple the number of FBI agents 
working on foreign bribery and corruption,34 does suggest that the US is serious 
about improving detection of foreign bribery independently of encouraging self-
reporting. Commentators linked the increase in resources for the FBI directly to 
criticisms that the DOJ had become too dependent on investigations conducted 
by those companies who were themselves involved in wrongdoing.35  
Unless companies know that they are at a high risk of being detected if 
they do not self-disclose wrong-doing, it is self-evident that they will be more 
likely to risk not self-disclosing. Any efforts to encourage self-reporting through 
offering leniency therefore have to be intimately linked with strategies to 
increase detection of wrongdoing through other means. 
 
1.2 SETTLEMENT CONTROVERSIES 
  
 
1.2.1 THE USE OF DPAs AND NPAs HAS EXONORATED INDIVIDUALS   
 
Perhaps the most serious and recurring criticism is that DPAs and NPAs 
have become a substitute for individual accountability for financial crime. Few 
individuals involved in some of the most serious financial scandals of the past 
decade have been imprisoned. As Senator Elizabeth Warren said in the Senate 
Banking Committee Hearing in March 2013, in relation to the DPA with HSBC 
for extensive money laundering including of Mexican drug cartel money:  
“if you get caught with an ounce of cocaine, the chances are good you’re going 
to go to jail... if you launder nearly a billion dollars for drug cartels and violate 
our international sanctions, your company pays a fine and you go home and 
sleep in your own bed at night. I think that’s fundamentally wrong.”36  
Prior to 2004, which is when the DOJ first used a DPA to resolve FCPA 
charges, 83% of FCPA enforcement actions also involved a related criminal 
                                                 
34 Wall Street Journal, 14th January 2015, “FBI to bulk up foreign bribery efforts,” 
http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/01/14/fbi-to-bulk-up-foreign-bribery-efforts/    
35 Ibid. 
36 https://harpers.org/archive/2013/05/too-big-to-jail/    
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prosecution of an individual.37 Conversely, between 2004 and 2014, 76% of 
DOJ enforcement actions relating to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act did not 
result in any individuals being charged. Professor Mike Koehler has shown that 
since 2004, where the DOJ entered an enforcement action that resulted in a 
guilty plea or criminal indictment, 71% of those actions have resulted in criminal 
charges against individuals. Only 9% of such enforcement actions resulted in 
charges against individuals. Koehler argues that the reason for a greater 
number of individual charges, when there is a plea agreement, is that these 
types of enforcement actions are higher quality actions, based on greater 
evidence.  
The lack of individual prosecutions is not just limited to the FCPA. At a 
broader level, only 23 (33%) of 66 DPAs with financial institutions resulted in 
individual employees being prosecuted between 2001 and 2014.38 In February 
2016, the chair of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Phil Angelides, wrote 
to the US Department of Justice urging it to conduct an urgent investigation into 
“individual misconduct” at major financial institutions before the 10 years statute 
of limitations expired, several of whom, such as Bank of America and JP 
Morgan, had entered large civil settlements with the DOJ for their role in the 
selling of ‘toxic’ mortgages that led to the 2008 financial crisis. Angelides wrote 
that individual investigations were necessary in order to “restore faith in the 
fairness of our justice system and to ensure deterrence for future wrongdoing.”39 
He told the Financial Times that the fact that no senior executives had been 
held to account “breeds a great amount of cynicism and anger about the nature 
of our judicial system.”40  
US Judge Sullivan severely criticized a September 2015 DPA that the 
DOJ made with General Motors for misleading the public over a safety defect 
that led to the loss of lives, in which the company paid a fine of $900 million. 
                                                 
37 Ibid, p. 541 
38http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2016/01/banks_that_break_the_law_are_fin
ally_getting_pursued_by_the_feds_it_s_not.2.html    
39 http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/LettertoAttorneyGeneralLorettaLynch.pdf    
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Sullivan described the case as “a shocking example of potentially culpable 
individuals not being criminally charged”.41  
The DPA with General Motors was made a week after the DOJ 
announced a shift in policy, known as the Yates memo, towards holding 
culpable individuals to account.42 The Yates memo states that in order to qualify 
for cooperation credit, companies must provide all relevant facts relating to 
individuals responsible for misconduct.  
It is too early to assess how much difference the Yates memo will make. 
One former DOJ prosecutor predicted in November 2015 that the DOJ would 
back away from its all or nothing approach because it would make companies 
less likely to cooperate.43 Other commentators expressed their concern that 
individuals would get scapegoated by companies44 and that companies would 
sacrifice individuals that they would already have to take action against to show 
remedial action had been taken.45 Clearly if the policy results in companies 
sacrificing low-rank employees but protecting high-ranks, it will not convince a 
sceptical public that individuals are in reality being held to account.  
Without prosecution of individuals involved in the wrongdoing it is 
questionable whether real deterrence of financial crime can be achieved and 
justice be served. US Judge Rakoff in particular has suggested that: “the future 
deterrent value of successfully prosecuting individuals far outweighs the 
prophylactic benefits of imposing internal compliance measures that are often 
little more than window-dressing.”46  
Holding individuals to account need not and should not however be a 
substitute for holding corporations to account.  
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42 http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download    
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As US Attorney Preet Bharara put it: “It should not be one or the other; 
prosecute individuals or institutions. To effectively deter criminal conduct and do 
justice, we need to do both.”47  
 
1.3 THE USE OF DPAs AND NPAs CREATES THE IMPRESSION THAT 
COMPANIES CAN BUY THEMSLEVES OUT OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
AND REPRESENT AN OVER-LENIENT RESPONSE TO SERIOUS CRIME  
 
Evidence suggests that DPAs and NPAs are used disproportionately for 
large domestic companies in the US. As Senator Elizabeth Warren puts it in her 
January 2016 report, Rigged Justice, the failure to prosecute corporations and 
their executives “has a corrosive effect on the fabric of democracy and our 
shared belief that we are all equal in the eyes of the law.”48  
The DPA that the DOJ entered into with HSBC in 2012 in relation to 
allegations of money laundering laws particularly with regard to money from 
drug cartels in Mexico caused widespread outcry in the US.49  A New York 
Times editorial stated: “when a prosecutor decides not to prosecute to the full 
extent of the law in a case as egregious as this, the law itself is diminished.”50  
Many legal commentators have argued in the same vein that to give DPAs 
and NPAs in cases of serious wrongdoing undermines the legal system itself. A 
former US white-collar crime prosecutor writes that by “wrongly allow[ing] even 
the most serious corporate offenders effectively to buy their way out of criminal 
liability, [DPAs] erode the moral force of the criminal law”.51 Another former top 
DOJ prosecutor of environmental offences and now law professor, David 
Uhlmann, agrees. He writes that “when the most serious criminal violations can 
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be handled outside the criminal justice system ...the rule of law is weakened.”52 
Uhlmann argues that the use of DPAs and NPAs “minimize[s] criminal conduct 
and may risk condoning it”.  
The issue of whether DPAs are appropriate for cases of egregious 
wrongdoing was brought to the fore in February 2015, when for the first time 
ever a US Judge rejected a DPA in a criminal case, on the grounds that it was 
“grossly disproportionate to the gravity” of the conduct in question. Judge Leon 
raised serious concerns about the Deferred Prosecution Agreement with Dutch 
company, Fokker Services, which related to Fokker shipping aircraft systems to 
Iran, Sudan and Burma in breach of US sanctions against those countries. Leon 
was particularly concerned about:  
• the inadequacy of the fine (which only represented the revenue collected 
from illegal transactions and no more);  
• the fact that no individuals were prosecuted while a number of 
employees implicated in the conduct were allowed to stay with the 
company after some “training”;  
• and finally the fact that no independent monitor had been appointed.  
 
Leon concluded that “it would undermine the public’s confidence in the 
administration of justice and promote disrespect for the law for it to see a 
defendant prosecuted so anaemically for engaging in such egregious conduct 
for such a sustained period of time and for the benefit of one of our countries’ 
worst enemies.”  
Some legal experts in the US are arguing for the abolition of DPAs and 
NPAs altogether, on the grounds that plea bargains achieve most of the 
objectives of a DPA but with greater accountability. Others, such as former 
prosecutor, David Uhlmann, argue that “if [DPAs] occur at all, [they] should be 
limited to relatively minor cases where civil or administrative enforcement is not 
available or the exceptional case where other non-criminal alternatives are 
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344,  https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1782&context=articles   
  -17- 
inadequate.”53 There is no doubt that the use of DPAs and NPAs for cases of 
serious wrongdoing has increased the controversy surrounding them and 
undermined public trust in enforcement of serious white collar crime in the US. 
 
 
1.4 THE USE OF DPAs AND NPAs FAIL TO DETER ECONOMIC CRIME  
 
Despite the record fines imposed through DPAs and NPAs, there is 
growing concern that these agreements offer little deterrent value and are seen 
as a cost of doing business.54 Randall Eliason, former fraud prosecutor from the 
US Attorney’s office for the District of Columbia suggests that “if the prospect of 
real criminal sanctions against the company is removed, then engaging in 
criminal activity becomes just another dollars-and-cents decision. The moral 
condemnation aspect of a criminal conviction is lost – and with it the unique 
deterrent value of criminal law”.55  
In 2009, the US Government Accountability Office undertook a review of 
the DOJ’s use of DPAs and NPAs and recommended that the US DOJ develop 
performance measures to assess the efficacy of their use. In particular it 
suggested looking at recidivism rates among companies offered DPAs and 
NPAs, and whether a company successfully meets the terms of the 
agreement.56 Without such measures, the GAO concluded it would be difficult 
for the DOJ to justify its increasing use of such agreements. The OECD 
Working Group on Bribery also noted that despite giving the US “an impressive 
FCPA enforcement record”, the “actual deterrent effect [of DPAs and NPAs] has 
not been quantified.”57  
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 The seemingly high rate of recidivism among companies who receive 
DPAs is increasingly cited as one of the factors that point to their low deterrent 
value.58 US Judge Rakoff cites the case of Pfizer, which between 2002 and 
2009 was offered no fewer than four DPAs for criminal wrongdoing, as an 
example of “the patent ineffectiveness” of DPAs to deter corporate criminal 
wrongdoing.59 Concerns over recidivism rates among companies being offered 
DPAs has led to calls for the DOJ to refuse to enter into a second DPA with a 
company if it is already operating under one; “two strikes and you’re out.”60  
Karpoff, Lee and Martin suggest that the US, which is regarded as the 
most aggressive enforcer of anti-bribery laws globally with by far the highest 
level of fines, “imposes insufficient expected penalties to offset firms’ economic 
incentive to bribe”. Their research shows that financial penalties would need to 
increase by 9.2 times or the probability of getting caught to 58.5% to offset that 
incentive.61 Law academics Stevenson and Wagoner likewise argue that “the 
fines imposed for engaging in foreign corrupt practices comprise a tiny fraction 
of the potential revenue generated by lucrative contracts ...[and] when 
discounted by the low probability of detection, these sanctions are far too low to 
deter unlawful activity.”62 Since the majority of FCPA violations are disposed of 
by DPAs or NPAs, the question is whether the full deterrent value of the FCPA 
has been blunted by their use.  
Companies which receive penalties for violations of the FCPA tend to 
face little reputational loss, as long as the charges against them are not 
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comingled with financial fraud charges.63 It is not clear whether this low 
reputational loss is specific to the FCPA and foreign bribery itself or is linked to 
the use of DPAs to resolve foreign bribery charges. One former federal 
prosecutor, Michael Clarke, told the Washington Post in relation to bank 
settlements: “companies are happy to enter into these deferred prosecution 
agreements because it’s become so commonplace now. They take a bath in the 
press for a finite period. The stock market doesn’t even seem to punish them.”64  
But the real issue at the heart of whether DPAs and NPAs lack deterrent 
value is the protection they offer from the collateral consequences of a 
conviction. 
 
1.5 DPAs AND NPAs SHIELD COMPANIES FROM COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES SUCH AS DEBARMENT  
 
One of the key reasons why the use of DPAs and NPAs limits the full 
deterrent value of the law is that they shield companies from potential 
debarment. As the OECD Working Group on Bribery noted in its 2010 report on 
the US implementation of the anti-bribery Convention, while the US has the 
legal framework to debar companies for FCPA violations, “it has rarely done so 
in foreign bribery cases.”65 While theoretically, a DPA or an NPA does not stop 
an agency from debarring a company, this does not appear to have happened 
in practice.  
The US is not alone. The OECD Foreign Bribery Report found that of 427 
foreign bribery enforcement actions between 1999 and 2014, only two had 
resulted in debarment.66 This is despite the fact that the OECD specifically 
                                                 
63 Karpoff, Lee and Martin, “The Value of Foreign Bribery to Bribe-Paying Firms”, June 2015, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1573222    
64https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/rbs-to-pay-612m-to-resolve-libor-
case/2013/02/06/2c0cc42c-6fd3-11e2-aa58-243de81040ba_story.html    
65 OECD Working Group on Bribery, “Phase 3 report on US implementation of the Anti-Bribery 
Convention”, October 2010, para 142. http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/UnitedStatesphase3reportEN.pdf    
66 OECD, “OECD Foreign Bribery Report: an analysis of the crime of bribery of foreign public 
officials”, December 2014, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecd-foreign-bribery-report-
9789264226616-en.htm     
  -20- 
recommends that companies convicted of corruption face the sanction of being 
excluded from public contracts. The OECD Foreign Bribery Report urged 
countries to ensure that companies and individuals convicted of foreign bribery 
“can be and are debarred from participation in national public procurement 
contracting.”  
The lack of debarment resulting from FCPA enforcement actions led to 
concerns in 2010 in the US House of Representatives that “settlements of civil 
and criminal cases by the DOJ are being used as a shield to foreclose other 
appropriate remedies such as suspension and debarment”.67 In September 
2010, the House of Representatives introduced the Overseas Contractor 
Reform Bill in response to these concerns stipulating that companies that 
violate the FCPA be automatically proposed for debarment. The Bill was passed 
unanimously by the House but was not enacted before the House was 
suspended, and so lapsed.  
However, the lack of debarment from FCPA violations is not just down to 
the use of DPAs. In some instances the DOJ has specifically crafted plea 
agreements with companies to ensure that they avoid debarment. In the 
Siemens and BAE cases, the DOJ brought alternative charges to corruption 
charges against the companies specifically to help the companies avoid 
debarment rules under the EU Procurement Directive, and possibly in the US 
too. While BAE’s $400 million fine from the DOJ was touted at the time as one 
of the largest criminal fines in the history of the DOJ’s “effort to combat 
overseas corruption”, a year after BAE pleaded guilty to making false 
statements about its FCPA compliance program, BAE had received 13,000 
contracts or subcontracts from US government bodies worth over $6 billion, 
including a $40 million contract with the FBI itself which had helped investigate 
BAE’s wrongdoing.68 Critics rightly question how much financial pain BAE 
actually felt from its fine in that context.  
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Without debarment, enforcement actions involve solely the imposition of 
a fine. Critics of DPAs argue that companies should face debarment as a 
consequence of wrongdoing. Brandon Garrett in Too Big to Jail argues that “for 
corporate prosecutions to have real teeth, debarment and suspension should be 
exercised more clearly and forcefully, particularly for recidivists.”69 Mike 
Koehler, a professor who specializes in the FCPA, likewise argued in testimony 
before the US Senate in November 2010 that debarment is necessary “in order 
for the DOJ’s deterrence message to be clearly heard and understood.”70 
Others argue that debarment is potentially the most significant deterrent to 
engaging in bribery and other crimes.71  
One of the dangers of crafting enforcement actions to avoid collateral 
consequences, whether through a DPA or selective charging, is that it creates 
an uneven enforcement system. O’Sullivan argues that to take collateral 
consequences into account makes criminal charging a matter of “market 
roulette”.72 Those companies that have substantial government contracts are in 
effect likely to be treated more leniently. As O’Sullivan argues, to take collateral 
consequences of debarment into account also results in prosecutors effectively 
working with guilty parties to avoid “the valid regulatory interest” that 
procurement bodies have in knowing whether a company has been involved in 
wrongdoing. Ultimately, by shaping enforcement actions around debarment 
risks, companies are shielded from the consequences of their actions by the 
people whose sole job should be holding them to account before the law.  
But it also puts corporations in the position of having special pleading 
rights, based on the threat of going out of business, above individuals. As Judge 
Sullivan noted in his powerful 2015 judgment calling for DPAs to be used as 
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originally intended, “society is harmed at least as much by the devastating effect 
that felony convictions have on the lives of its citizens as it is by the effect of 
criminal convictions on corporations.” Individuals do not get their criminal 
charges shaped, however, by the collateral impact a conviction might have on 
the community.  
 
1.6 THE USE OF DPAs and NPAs IS UNREGULATED AND LACKS ANY 
OVERSIGHT  
 
There is growing consensus that the lack of judicial or independent 
oversight in the use of DPAs and NPAs in the US has left prosecutors with 
unfettered power. Prosecutors essentially act as judge and jury. As a result, the 
boundaries of the laws concerned are not tested and there is scope for abuse of 
power. As Barkow and Cipolla put it, “DPAs and NPAs operate in an 
unregulated sphere without the presence of a neutral arbiter to check the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and power”.73  
There has been increasing judicial concern in the US. For some time, 
judges essentially rubber-stamped settlements put before them by prosecutors. 
But in September 2009, Judge Rakoff rejected a civil settlement or Consent 
Judgement put before him by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
and the Bank of America on the grounds it did not “comport with the most 
elementary standards of justice and morality.” In February 2010 he reluctantly 
approved a modified settlement between the SEC and Bank of America 
describing it as “half-baked justice at best”.74  
Rakoff went on to reject another settlement between the SEC and 
Citigroup in 2011, ruling that the $285 million fine imposed on Citigroup in that 
settlement was “pocket change” for Citigroup and was “neither reasonable, nor 
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fair, nor adequate, nor in the public interest.”75 Rakoff was forced to sign off on 
the settlement after an appeal court said he had overstepped the mark. The 
Appeal court said that judges could not demand facts in Consent Judgements, 
and that while “trials are primarily about truth... Consent decrees are primarily 
about pragmatism.”76 Rakoff issued his own 3 page opinion in response stating 
that as a result of the Appeal Courts ruling, SEC settlements overseen by the 
courts would “be subject to no meaningful oversight whatsoever.”77  
Rakoff’s refusal to rubber stamp SEC settlements sparked off a rash of 
other judges questioning or rejecting SEC settlements. In June 2013, the SEC 
modified its ‘neither admit nor deny’ policy stating that it may require admissions 
of wrongdoing in egregious cases, though for some this did not go far enough.78  
US judges have started to flex their muscles in relation to DOJ criminal 
settlements as well. Judge Gleeson approved the DPA with HSBC in July 2013 
on the grounds that it accomplished much of what a criminal conviction would 
have done, but he asserted the right of the court to reject or accept a DPA, 
stating that the court was not “a potted plant”. The court, he argued, must 
protect itself from “lending a judicial imprimatur to any aspect of a criminal 
proceeding that smacks of lawlessness or impropriety.”79 Gleeson made the 
DPA “subject to a continued monitoring [by the court] of its execution and 
implementation”, requiring quarterly reports to be made.  
In February 2015, when Judge Leon rejected the DPA in the Fokker 
case, he did so, on the grounds that it was not an appropriate exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion though he said he would consider another more 
appropriate settlement if it was put before him.80 He argued that “the integrity of 
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judicial proceedings would be compromised by giving the Court’s stamp of 
approval to either overly-lenient prosecutorial action or overly-zealous 
prosecutorial conduct.” An appeals court considered whether Judge Leon was 
justified in his rejection of the DPA or even had the power to reject it.81  
The Appeals Court didn’t uphold the Fokker ruling, so until today judicial 
oversight of DPAs hasn’t become a more regular part of US DPAs.82  
Judicial oversight may not, however, be a panacea. Some judges will 
provide more oversight and demand more transparency than others and it will 
depend on what legal basis their oversight is based (there is no proper statutory 
footing for DPAs in the US, with prosecutors relying on the Speedy Trial Act to 
bring them before a court). Ultimately if judges are limited solely to the 
submissions of the prosecutor and the defendant who have pre-agreed a deal, it 
is questionable how deep their assessment of the merits of a DPA can ever be.  
 
1.7 TAX DEDUCTIBILITY OF FINES AND PENALTIES AND 
TRANSPARENCY OF SETTLEMENT DETAILS  
 
Another issue that has made settlements controversial in the US in 
recent years has been the fact that companies that enter into settlements in the 
US are able to claim tax deductions on the fines and penalties, and that details 
of settlements are frequently scanty. A 2015 study by the Public Interest 
Research group found that of the $80 billion paid in fines in out of court 
settlements between 2012 and 2014, $48 billion could have been written off as 
a tax deduction by the companies involved.83 It also found that while the DOJ 
makes details available about its large settlements, the Department only 
disclosed the texts of settlement in 25% of cases. In September 2015, the US 
Senate passed the Truth in Settlements Act which would require detailed, 
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publically accessible disclosure, including details of tax deductibility, of the 
settlement agreements between government agencies or regulatory bodies and 
companies.84  
The US tax code specifically prohibits companies from taking a tax 
deduction on criminal fines or civil penalties, and the DOJ has long written into 
some DPAs that companies must not seek a tax deduction from their fine. The 
Public Interest Research Group in its 2015 study found, however, that only half 
of DOJ’s largest criminal settlements between 2012 and 2014 specified the tax 
status for penalties while the tax-status of the non-penalty part of the fine (e.g. 
compensation and restitution) was not specified. For instance, the 2013 civil 
settlement between the DOJ and JP Morgan Chase for illegally marketing and 
selling mortgage backed securities imposed a fine of $13 billion, $11 billion of 
which the DOJ allowed the bank to classify as a legitimate business expense 
that could be deducted against tax. PIRG concluded that the DOJ only ensured 
that between 2012 and 2014 18.4 percent of settlement fines were non-tax 
deductible.  
In 2013, the US Internal Revenue Service stated that unless expressly 
forbidden to do so, “almost every defendant/tax payer deducts the full amount” 
of the settlement as a business expense.85 Some have argued that for 
companies not to be able to seek such tax deduction represents a hidden 
penalty which penalizes US companies more heavily than non-US ones.86 The 
Public Interest Research Group however makes the point that the tax-
deductibility of settlements undermines their deterrent value and sends the 
message that the activity that forms the basis of the settlement “is acceptable 
                                                 
84 Ibid. 
85 Quoted at page 5, footnote 11 of Phineas Baxandall and Michelle Surka, Public Interest 
Research Group “Settling for a Lack of Accountability: Which Federal Agencies Allow 
Companies To Write Off Out-of-Court Settlements and Which are Transparent About It”, 
December 2015, http://uspirg.org/spites/pirg/files/reports/USPIRG_SettlementsReport.pdf    
86 Shearman and Sterlin, “A new tool and a twist? The SEC’s first Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement and a Novel Punitive Measure,” May 2011, 
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2011/05/A-New-Tool-and-a-
Twist--The-SECs-first-Deferred-__/Files/View-full-memo-A-New-Tool-and-a-Twist--The-SECs-
__/FileAttachment/LT052411ANewToolandaTwist.pdf.    
  -26- 
business as usual” as well as depriving the US tax payer of important tax 
dollars.  
 
1.8 DPAs, NPAs and PLEA BARGAINS IN RELATION TO CORRUPTION 
AND FOREIGN BRIBERY DO NOT PROVIDE FOR RESTITUTION FOR 
VICTIMS OR RETURN THE PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTION TO AFFECTED 
COUNTRIES  
 
The World Bank and UNODC, Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StaR) 
2013 report, Left out of the Bargain: Settlements in Foreign Bribery Cases and 
implications for asset recovery found that of 395 settlements for bribery 
between 1999 and mid-2012, resulting in $6.9 billion of monetary sanctions 
imposed, only $197 million or 3.3% was returned to the countries whose 
officials were bribed.87  
Since the US has imposed by far the majority of those sanctions, most of 
the money has gone to the US Treasury. US law professor, Andy Spalding, 
notes: “tragically this does little to help the true victims of the bribery.”88 
Although early FCPA enforcement actions did include restitution to victims, later 
ones have not.89 The issue is specific to the FCPA and is not limited to DPAs. 
DPAs for other financial crime regularly include restitution clauses, while it is not 
clear whether restitution for FCPA violations would be available even with a full 
court trial.  
There have been attempts in recent years to get US courts to recognize 
the importance of restitution for victims of corruption, although the issue is 
legally fraught. In May 2011, the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) sought a 
court injunction to block a settlement between the DOJ and Alcatel-Lucent, 
which comprised a DPA with the parent company and plea agreements with 
subsidiaries. ICE, whose officials including directors had been bribed, argued 
that no individual was being sanctioned and that the settlement “provides that 
                                                 
87World Bank/StAR report “Left Out of The Bargain: Settlements in Foreign Bribery Cases and 
Implications for Asset Recovery”, October 2013, 
http://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/9781464800863.pdf     
88 http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/4/15/wal-marts-victims-part-i.html    
89http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/5/16/wal-marts-victims-part-viii-so-what-should-we-do.html    
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the illegal proceeds obtained from victims be distributed to the [US] Federal 
government.”90 ICE argued that by waiving pre-sentence investigation and 
report, the settlement avoided the requirement for mandatory restitution to 
victims and that under the Crime Victims Rights Act, it should be recognized as 
a victim and awarded restitution. The case was rejected both in the first 
instance and on appeal on the grounds that ICE suffered from institutional 
corruption, and was therefore a co-conspirator with the company rather than a 
victim and that ICE had failed to demonstrate that it was directly harmed by the 
offending.91 The DOJ also pointed out that Alcatel Lucent had already been 
required by the Costa Rican government to pay it $10 million in reparations for 
‘moral damages’. The case showed how hard it is to identify victims of 
corruption in the US legal system.  
Following on from this, in March 2012, Nigerian NGO Social and 
Economic Rights and Accountability Project wrote to the SEC asking it to 
“establish an efficient case-by-case process for the payment of some or all of 
FCPA civil penalty and disgorgement to or for the benefit of the victimized 
foreign government agency or the citizens of the affected foreign country.”92 The 
SEC said it would give “appropriate consideration” to the suggestion. It is not 
clear that the SEC has in fact returned any FCPA fine to an affected country 
since. 
Andy Spalding has argued that in the FCPA context, the DOJ could set 
up a Supplemental Transparency Project along the lines of the Supplemental 
Environmental Project already in place for companies who violate 
environmental laws in the US who may voluntarily agree to perform a project to 
improve the environment. Spalding cites the DOJ brokered deal in 2008 to 
create the BOTA Foundation, an organization to improve the lives of children in 
                                                 
90http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/5/5/costa-rican-victim-objects-to-alcatel-lucent-
settlement.html    
91http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/node/19801     
92 http://serap-nigeria.org/us-govt-agrees-to-consider-seraps-request-to-share-foreign-bribery-
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poverty in Kazakhstan, as the beneficiary of $80 million of bribe payments found 
in Kazakh leaders’ Swiss bank accounts, paid by a US lawyer, James Giffen.93  
Whether such voluntary agreements would satisfy the basic notion of fair 
compensation for damage caused that restitution encompasses is a matter for 
debate. What is clear is that as Spalding puts it “using enforcement revenue to 
benefit actual victims is the next frontier of anti-corruption law enforcement,”94 
with all its uncertainties. Article 53 (b) of the UN Convention Against Corruption 
clearly states that State Parties should ensure that its courts can “pay 
compensation or damages to another State Party that has been harmed” by 
corruption offences. What the Convention is silent on is what should happen 
where a State Party that has been harmed refuses to seek such compensation 
or damages. Clearly, allowing all the money paid by companies by way of 
penalty for corruption offences to go into the treasuries of wealthy countries is 
not a morally sustainable position. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
93 http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/6/10/wal-marts-victims-part-xiv-we-did-it-before-we-can-
do-it-aga.html    
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CHAPTER TWO: THE UK’S DEFERRED PROSECUTION REGIME – NEW 
STANDARDS OR MORE OF THE SAME?  
 
The UK government introduced DPAs in February 2014 as “the next 
instrument in the battle against economic crime” which, the government said, 
“too often goes without redress” in the UK.95  
In introducing them the government specifically adapted DPAs to the UK 
system, which unlike the US does not endorse plea bargaining, to ensure that 
they were subject to judicial scrutiny. Additionally, the UK has eschewed Non 
Prosecution Agreements altogether and has stated that prosecution would 
continue to be the priority where a “DPA would not be in the public interest or an 
organization's alleged wrongdoing is very serious.”96 David Green, the Director 
of the Serious Fraud Office, which is largely responsible for negotiating DPAs 
with companies in relation to financial crime, has said that the bar for getting a 
DPA “is a high one,”97 with a self-report by a company and full cooperation 
essential.  
Because of the more nuanced approach the UK has taken and the 
judicial scrutiny built in to the UK’s regime, commentators in Australia, Canada 
and Ireland have all suggested that the UK model may provide the way forward 
for corporate settlements. Arguments for stronger corporate liability in the UK  
 
2.1 Background to the Introduction of DPAs in the UK  
 
The key reasons for introducing DPAs in the UK were to:  
 
1. avoid the uncertainty, expense, complexity or length of a criminal trial  
                                                 
95 Consultation on a new enforcement tool to deal with economic crime committed by 
commercial organisations: Deferred Prosecution Agreements. Ministry of Justice. May 2012, 
https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/deferred-prosecution-
agreements/supporting_documents/deferredprosecutionagreementsconsultation.pdf    
96https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/236000/8463.pd
f.    
97 David Green’s speech to Cambridge Symposium on Economic Crime, September 2015, 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2015/09/07/cambridge-symposium-2015/    
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2. incentivize companies to self-report their wrong-doing thereby resulting in 
more cases of economic crime being identified and penalized;98  
3. avoid the “unintended detrimental consequences” of a criminal prosecution 
for a company, including “adverse share price movements and failure of 
organizations” which impact innocent employees, investors, pensioners and 
customers.99  
 
DPAs were introduced due to serious criticism from the OECD about the 
Serious Fraud Office’s use of civil recovery orders to deal with overseas 
corruption. In March 2012, the OECD stated that this settlement process was 
“opaque, lacks accountability and thus fails to instill public and judicial 
confidence.”100 The government has recognized that civil recovery orders do not 
ultimately penalize companies for their wrongdoing or allow victims to be 
compensated.101 
DPAs were also introduced to enable the UK to enter into settlements 
that included other jurisdictions, particularly the US. In a key court ruling, 
Innospec, in March 2010, a high court judge ruled that prosecutors were not in a 
position to agree sanctions for criminal conduct with a company, that any 
arrangements to do so were unconstitutional and that “no such arrangements 
should be made again.”102 Without the introduction of DPAs, UK prosecutors 
                                                 
98 Deferred Prosecution Agreements Code of Practice: The Directors’ response to the public 
consultation, Serious Fraud Office and CPS, 11/2/2014 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/264627/dpa%20code%20of%20practice%20response.pdf     
99 Para 27, Consultation on a new enforcement tool to deal with economic crime committed by 
commercial organisations: Deferred Prosecution Agreements. Ministry of Justice. May 2012, 
https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/deferred-prosecution-
agreements/supporting_documents/deferredprosecutionagreementsconsultation.pdf    
100 Commentary, p 24, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 
the United Kingdom, OECD Working Group on Bribery. March 2012.   
101 Para 29, Consultation on a new enforcement tool to deal with economic crime committed by 
commercial organisations: Deferred Prosecution Agreements. Ministry of Justice. May 2012, 
https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-  
102https://login.westlaw.co.uk/maf/wluk/app/document?&srguid=i0ad6290300000161658e525eb
638216a&docguid=I6F4C7D30914C11DF9D29B4CD5D21A248&hitguid=I6F4C7D30914C11D
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would have been unable to participate in global settlements except by civil 
means. Under the DPA regime in the UK, prosecutors and companies can 
agree sanctions, although a judge must decide whether the DPA is ‘in the 
interests of justice’ and whether the terms are fair, reasonable and 
proportionate.  
 
2.2 How does the UK’s DPA Regime Measure Up to the US in Practice?  
 
It took nearly 2 years after DPAs were legislatively introduced for the 
UK’s first DPA to materialize. On 30th November 2015, the high court approved 
a DPA between the SFO and Standard Bank for failure by Standard Bank to 
prevent bribery by its Tanzanian subsidiary under Section 7 of the Bribery Act. 
Although it may be too early to tell how the DPA system will roll out in the UK, 
the first DPA was seen as setting some important precedents and provides a 
useful example of how UK DPAs will compare with US ones.  
 
2.3 ADVANTAGES OF THE UK’S DPA MODEL OVER THE U.S MODEL  
 
2.3.1 Judicial oversight  
 
Under the Crime and Courts Act, a DPA must be reviewed by a judge to 
assess whether it is in the interests of justice. A UK DPA has to go through two 
stages of judicial approval: one for approval to proceed and the other an 
approval of the final agreement. However, much of this oversight effectively 
takes place behind closed doors. The first stage of approval where the real 
judicial scrutiny of an agreement takes place will always be in private, as 
specified by the legislation.  
The fact that judges can ask the prosecutor and the company difficult 
questions obviously increases both scrutiny and potentially public confidence in 
the agreement. Judge Leveson made a point of noting in his judgment 
approving the Standard Bank DPA that he had made a “detailed analysis” of 
                                                                                                                                               
F9D29B4CD5D21A248&rank=76&spos=76&epos=76&td=163&crumb-
action=append&context=13&resolvein=true    
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both the circumstances of the offence and the assessment of the financial 
penalty imposed and that “there is no question of the parties having reached a 
private compromise without appropriate independent judicial consideration of 
the public interest.”103 Leveson significantly released both the judgment for his 
preliminary and final approval of the DPA.104  
It remains the case that UK judges are limited to the evidence put before 
them that is essentially agreed between the prosecutor and the defendant.105 
Third parties such as victim states or individual victims are not able to present 
additional evidence to the court and due to the confidentiality of the DPA 
process the public will not know about a DPA until it is in effect.  
 
2.3.2 Compensation  
 
Under the terms of Standard Bank’s DPA compensation was awarded to 
Tanzania (though whether it was sufficient is another question.)106 UK 
prosecutors have been committed for some time to ensuring reparations in 
corruption cases where possible, leaving the thorny issue of how to return 
money to potentially corrupt jurisdictions essentially to government. However, 
UK Courts have not been so willing to grant compensation in corruption cases. 
In the 2010 Innospec case, Lord Justice Thomas stated that while 
compensation was “desirable”, there were insufficient funds to encompass both 
compensation and a fine, and questioned why the SFO was seeking 
compensation for one country (Iraq) and not another (Indonesia). In the 2016 
sentencing of Smith and Ouzman, the first overseas corruption case to go 
before a UK jury, the judge refused to give compensation altogether on the 
grounds he was not sure which institution the compensation should go to and 
whether it would get there, that he had no evidence that the countries 
                                                 
103https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/sfo-v-standard-bank_Final_1.pdf     
104https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/sfo-v-standard 
bank_Preliminary_1.pdf     
105 Under the Code of Practice on Deferred Prosecution Agreements a court may ask for more 
information about the facts or terms of a proposed DPA.   
106http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/12/8/did-the-uks-first-dpa-comply-with-the-un-convention-
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concerned were seeking it, and no evidence that they had sought to take action 
against their own officials.107  
The result of this is that the UK is in the somewhat perverse position 
where companies that cooperate and self-report, and are therefore rewarded 
with a DPA, will be required to compensate while those that end up before the 
courts are unlikely to.  
 
2.3.3 Transparency and provision of detail  
 
The Standard Bank DPA provided a significant amount of detail about 
the alleged offences involved. This compares favorably to the US where as 
Gibson Dunn notes ”DPAs frequently do not go into the level of detail included 
in the Standard Bank DPA and rely more heavily on general descriptions of 
events.”108 Another example of better practice in the UK DPA was the clear 
naming of the officials alleged to have received bribes and involved in paying 
them either by name or by rank. Typically US DPAs rarely identify the foreign 
officials or individuals involved.  
This level of transparency sets an important precedent for settlements 
globally. Unless DPAs can provide as much information about an offence as a 
court trial would, it is unlikely that the public will have full confidence in their 
transparency. Critically in corruption cases, it is crucial that the public of 
affected countries are able to know the names of officials who took bribes so 
they can also be held to account.  
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2.3.4 More stringent conditions for being given a DPA  
 
In the US, cooperation is a factor that prosecutors consider when 
deciding whether to offer a DPA or not, and the DOJ makes clear when it brings 
criminal action against a company that this is often due to lack of cooperation. 
In the UK, the bar is currently considerably higher. The Code of Practice on 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements makes clear that a self-report by a company 
of its wrongdoing and provision of information of which the prosecutor would 
otherwise have been unaware is a key over-riding consideration.  
SFO staff has restated this approach publicly on a regular basis. The 
Standard Bank DPA confirmed this approach, when Leveson stated that in 
assessing whether the agreement was in the public interest, “of particular 
significance was the promptness of the self-report”. Moreover as the 2016 guilty 
plea by Sweett shows,109 where a company does not self-report or cooperate in 
the initial stages of an investigation, even if it provides information about an 
alleged offence and decides to cooperate at a later date, the SFO will not issue 
an invitation for a DPA.  
 
2.4 DISADVANTAGES OF THE UK’S DPA MODEL COMPARED TO THE US 
MODEL  
 
2.4.1 Failure to use the DPA as leverage for full disclosure of wrongdoing  
 
In the US, DPAs often have a requirement for a company to disclose 
details about any newly uncovered potentially corrupt payments. Each of the 
FCPA related DPAs since 2011 includes some form of reporting requirement to 
disclose ‘questionable’ payments uncovered. Some DPAs go further and 
require disclosure of any potential criminal violation. As Gibson Dunn noted, the 
Standard Bank DPA only required the bank to cooperate with the SFO with 
regard to the conduct that is the basis for the DPA. This provides Standard 
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Bank “with greater flexibility when considering disclosure of unrelated conduct” 
compared to a US DPA.110  
US DPAs often also require disclosure about information relating to a 
parent company and affiliates. There is no such requirement in the Standard 
DPA which Gibson Dunn calls “surprising” given the role of the Bank’s 
Tanzanian subsidiary.  
 
2.4.2 Reliance on company’s internal investigation  
 
It is clear that the SFO relied heavily on Standard Bank’s internal 
investigation as the basis for information about the alleged wrongdoing and did 
not seek information independently from Tanzania. The Judge approving the 
DPA did not appear from documents in the public domain to question whether 
the SFO had adequately investigated Standard’s version of events were true or 
would stand up to court scrutiny. In particular, the SFO did not seek or obtain 
any documentation from Tanzania to corroborate assertions made by the 
company.111 Its own investigation appears to have been limited to interviews 
with various employees and former employees of Standard Bank in the UK. A 
local employee who was alleged to have committed the predicate offence of 
bribery which Standard failed to prevent – the wrongdoing that the DPA was 
based on – has now initiated legal action against Standard Bank for 
misrepresenting her role and failing to give her adequate right to reply. 
 
2.4.3 Weaker compliance reporting standards 
 
The Standard Bank DPA has “a much less detailed compliance review 
and remediation program than that commonly seen in US DPAs.”112 And 
                                                 
110Gibson Dunn, 2015 Year End Update on Corporate Non Prosecution Agreements and 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2015-Year-
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reporting requirements on compliance is much more generous. In the US, 
companies need to report annually for the entire term of the agreement. 
Standard Bank’s DPA stipulated that the Bank must complete its review and 
remediation program within two years and there is no follow-on reporting 
requirement.  
 
2.4.4 Weaker breach requirements  
 
Under the UK’s DPA model breach of a DPA must be determined by a 
court and not by the prosecutor which gives greater oversight over potential 
breaches. However, in the US there are much broader and expansive causes 
for breach of agreement. For instance, the commission of any crime and 
commission of any acts that would violate the FCPA if they had occurred within 
the FCPA’s jurisdictional reach can be a basis for breach. Under the Standard 
Bank DPA, the basis for a breach of agreement is restricted to failure to comply 
with terms relating to the payment and the corporate compliance program.   
As Gibson Dunn put it: “the commission of a criminal act – even a 
violation of the UK Bribery Act – during the term of the agreement would not 
appear on the face of the DPA to be cause for breach”.113  
 
2.4.5 No requirement for admission of guilt  
 
Under the Code of Practice on Deferred Prosecution Agreements, while 
the prosecutor and the defendant company must agree on a set of facts, there 
is no formal requirement for an admission of guilt in respect of the charges at 
issue. Thus under the Standard Bank DPA, the bank agreed that the Statement 
of Facts was “true and accurate” but did not formally admit to the Section 7 
failure to prevent the bribery offence that was the basis for the DPA. Under the 
terms of a DPA, the Statement of Facts agreed between the prosecutor and the 
defendant is to be treated as an admission by the defendant only if any future 
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criminal proceedings are brought against the company in relation to those 
Facts.  
Under US DPAs, companies are generally required to admit to the 
wrongdoing concerned. Admission of guilt is key to public confidence in the use 
of DPAs and to avoid public perception that companies are able to buy 
themselves out of the justice system.  
 
2.5 SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE US AND UK REGIMES  
 
2.5.1 Lack of individuals held to account  
 
The DPA Code of Practice states that “it will ordinarily be appropriate that 
those individuals, whose actions have incriminated the company, be 
investigated and where appropriate prosecuted.”114 Justice Leveson in 
approving the Standard Bank DPA commented that “it is obviously in the public 
interest that individuals involved in the conduct at issue are investigated and 
prosecuted” but he also noted that “no allegation of knowing participation in an 
offence of bribery is alleged either against Standard Bank or any of its 
employees.”  
The apparent failure of the SFO to investigate whether any individuals at 
the UK branch of Standard Bank which authorized and drew up the agency 
agreement at the centre of the alleged offence committed an offence, sets a 
very worrying precedent. The UK’s first DPA suggests that the strongest and 
most consistent criticism of the US regime – that individuals are let off the hook 
by DPAs – may apply equally to the UK. 
 
2.5.2 Avoidance of collateral consequences  
 
Theoretically a company that receives a DPA may be subject to 
discretionary debarment for ‘grave professional misconduct’ under the EU 
Procurement Directives’ provisions on mandatory exclusion. In practice, 
because a DPA is not a conviction, this is highly unlikely. Furthermore, a 
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company that receives a DPA will by definition have cooperated with the 
investigating authorities, given compensation and been required to undertake 
remedial corporate governance measures – all aspects of ‘self-cleaning’ which 
a company must undertake in order to show itself to be a reliable economic 
operator under the EU Procurement Directives’ in the event of a conviction. It is 
worth noting that the UK government has said that even a conviction under the 
Section 7 ‘failure to prevent’ offence will only incur discretionary exclusion.115  
However, in the Code of Practice on Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 
one of the public interest factors a prosecutor may take into account is whether 
a conviction “is likely to have disproportionate consequences for the company” 
under the law of any country “including but not limited to the European Union” 
(2.8.2. vi). The current guidelines on corporate prosecution meanwhile clearly 
state that a public interest factor against prosecution is that “a conviction is 
likely to have adverse consequences for the company under European law, 
always bearing in mind the seriousness of the offence and any other relevant 
public interest factors”.116 The OECD Working Group on Bribery has asked the 
UK to remove such references to the EU debarment rules from prosecution 
guidelines.117 But this suggests that a DPA could still be used to help a 
company avoid debarment under the EU Procurement Directives.  
 
2.5.3 Possibility of repeat DPAs  
 
A key question relating to whether DPAs will have deterrent effect is 
whether a company in the UK could be offered a DPA more than once. A 
significant factor in favor of a prosecution under the Code of Practice on DPAs 
is ‘history of similar conduct’. In the Standard Bank DPA, Judge Leveson noted 
                                                 
115 The OECD Working Group on Bribery has asked the UK to develop guidelines for 
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that Standard Bank had no previous convictions for bribery and corruption and 
ruled that a fine and regulatory action from the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority 
for failings in Standard Bank’s anti-money laundering procedures was a 
different and unconnected issue.118 This raises the prospect that a company 
could receive a second DPA for a different economic crime, if judges and 
prosecutors only look at ‘similar conduct’ in a very narrow sense.  
 
2.5.4 Conclusion  
 
The experience so far suggests that the UK, at least under the current 
leadership of the Serious Fraud Office, will have a more balanced approach to 
the use of DPAs than the US, with prosecution clearly still very much part of the 
prosecutor’s weaponry, and much stricter criteria for entering into DPAs. DPAs 
will also have greater judicial oversight and higher levels of transparency.  
However, if a trend develops in DPAs whereby the SFO fails to bring 
related prosecutions of individuals for the conduct in question, and only takes a 
narrow look at whether a company has a history of ‘similar conduct’, there is a 
real risk that DPAs in the UK will fail to instill public confidence and to deter 
economic crime. Additionally, the fact that companies do not need to admit guilt 
under a DPA in the UK, nor make full disclosure of all wrongdoing they uncover 
in their investigations suggests significant weaknesses in the UK’s DPA regime. 
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CHAPTER THREE: KEEPING COMPANIES OUT OF COURT – CORPORATE 
SETTLEMENTS FOR BRIBERY IN EUROPE  
 
The OECD Working Group on Bribery has long recognized the use of out 
of court settlements to resolve foreign bribery cases as a ‘horizontal issue’ 
affecting various parties in the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The OECD’s 
concern has been whether such settlements are likely to comply with Article 3 of 
the Convention, which requires parties to ensure that bribery of foreign officials 
is “punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties.” 
However, this concern has often been dwarfed by the deeper concern that there 
has been little enforcement of foreign bribery offences in European countries at 
all, with the OECD issuing press releases about its serious concern about lack 
of implementation of the Convention in several instances.  
From the OECD’s monitoring reports on compliance with the Convention 
it is clear that many European countries have used some form of out of court 
settlement to resolve all of the few foreign bribery cases that they have 
investigated, and that in the European context there have been precious few 
prosecutions of companies for foreign bribery offences. In some cases, this has 
been due to weak corruption or corporate liability laws or other legal 
impediments. In a few cases, courts have either not convicted or overturned 
convictions. 
 
 
3.1 Dutch Out of Court Settlements  
 
Under article 74 of the Dutch Criminal Code and a Directive on Large 
and Special Transactions, prosecutors can enter into out of court settlements to 
resolve charges against companies. Out of court settlements do not require an 
admission of guilt, but prosecutors have the discretion to require such 
admission as part of the settlement. Settlements should not be used for 
offences which require punishment of over 6 years or in cases of public concern 
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without justification.119 Settlements involving cases of public concern must be 
approved by the Minister of Security and Justice. Where the fine is over 50,000 
Euros, the Directive stipulates that the public prosecutor’s office must issue a 
press release disclosing the parties, the fine and information about the offence. 
Such settlements can also include compensation to victims120.  
The Netherlands has resolved three foreign bribery cases through out of 
court settlements. This includes a case in December 2012 against Ballast 
Nedem, a Dutch construction company, for payments made to foreign agents, 
and a related December 2013 case against KPMG for its role in concealing 
Ballast Nedem’s payments. Very little detail was provided of the substance of 
the allegations and no individuals have yet been held to account. Ballast Nedem 
paid a fine of €5 million and was required to relinquish a claim to €12.5 million 
from the tax office, and KPMG, €7 million Euros.121  
In November 2014, the Dutch public prosecutor’s office (Openbaar 
Ministerie) offered Dutch company SBM Offshore an out-of-court settlement in 
which the company paid $240 million as a fine and disgorgement for payments 
in Equatorial Guinea, Angola and Brazil but without admitting guilt. No action 
was taken against any Dutch individuals. The public prosecutor’s office issued a 
statement in the case of SBM Offshore, providing reasons why it had chosen an 
out of court settlement (SMB’s self-reporting of material and introduction of new 
corporate governance measures) and gave some limited detail about the 
allegations, including the amount of commission payments made in each 
country (totalling $250 million). 
The settlement was controversial in the Netherlands when news reports 
revealed that SBM may have ‘contained’ its investigation and been selective 
                                                 
119 Debevoise and Plimpton, Small Country, Big Punch: the Netherlands Anti-Bribery 
Prosecution of SBM Offshore, December 2014, 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1ef21f00-f4af-4e39-a0f6-2b309dd9bb6f    
120 OECD Working Group on Bribery, Phase 3 Report on implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention in The Netherlands, December 2012, para 85-86 http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/Netherlandsphase3reportEN.pdf    
121 OECD Working Group on Bribery, Follow up on Phase 3 Report and Recommendations: the 
Netherlands, May 2015, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Netherlands-Phase-3-Written-
Follow-Up-Report-ENG.pdf    
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about what it revealed to enforcement officials in both the US and at home. A 
statement from the Dutch Shareholders Association, VEB, in response to these 
reports, said: “because of the settlement..., the court case has been avoided 
and as a result a lot of information about the alleged corruption has been kept 
from the public domain”.122  
In February 2016, Openbaar Ministerie entered into another out of court 
settlement with Russian telecom company, Vimpelcom, headquartered in the 
Netherlands. It was part of a joint settlement with the US DOJ, in which 
Vimpelcom and its subsidiary paid $397.5 million to the Dutch and $397.6 
million to the US DOJ and SEC in fines for bribes paid to an Uzbek government 
official in order to win bids for Uzbek telecom providers.123 In this case, the 
Dutch public prosecutor’s office issued a Statement of Facts, modelled on US 
DOJ ones (thus withholding names of company officials and the foreign officials 
bribed), and has stated that it is pursuing a prosecution against individuals. A 
press release on its website gives some detail about how it reached its decision 
to enter into an out of court settlement and assess fine levels.  
The OECD said in 2006 it would monitor the Netherlands’s use of out of 
court settlements to ensure that they result in “effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive sanctions” as required by the Anti-Bribery Convention.124  As it noted 
in its 2011 Phase 3 report of the Netherlands: “an out of court settlement would 
not be taken into account for EU debarment purposes. This may prove a very 
serious incentive to companies to try to settle (foreign) corruption cases out of 
court.”125 The Netherlands’s use of two out of court settlements to deal with 
foreign bribery cases was severely criticized  by the OECD in 2013 saying the 
Netherlands was failing to “vigorously pursue foreign bribery allegations” after 
                                                 
122 https://www.vn.nl/the-cover-up-at-dutch-multinational-sbm/    
123https://www.om.nl/algemeen/english/@93227/vimpelcom-pays-close/     
124 OECD Working Group on Bribery, “The Netherlands: Phase 2”, June 2006, p 68, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/36993012.pdf    
125 OECD Working Group on Bribery, “Phase 3 Report on implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention in The Netherlands”, December 2012, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/Netherlandsphase3reportEN.pdf    
  -43- 
the OECD found that 14 out of 22 allegations of foreign bribery had triggered no 
investigation at all by the Dutch enforcement authorities.126  
The Netherlands may be seeking to get quick results in wake of OECD 
criticism by pursuing out of court settlements. Its latest settlement with 
VimpelCom shows an attempt at greater transparency as well as the ability to 
achieve relatively high fine levels. However, if Dutch authorities continue to use 
only out of court settlements, this will shield companies from the collateral 
effects of the EU Procurement Directive, which stipulates that companies 
convicted of corruption must be excluded from public procurement for 5 years 
unless they can show they have ‘self-cleaned.’ It also remains to be seen how 
effectively the Dutch authorities will act against individuals.  
 
3.2 Norwegian Penalty Notices  
 
In Norway, cases against companies are typically settled out of court in 
the form of a penalty notice from the prosecutor’s office specifying a fine.127 In 
the context of foreign bribery, Okokrim, the Norwegian authority for investigating 
economic and environmental crime, has exclusively relied on penalty notices to 
deal with cases against companies.128  
When OECD examiners asked Okokrim in 2011 why they hadn’t taken a 
foreign bribery case to court to help establish sanction levels, officials replied 
that “economic crime trials are usually very lengthy and a much bigger burden 
on law enforcement resources .... furthermore, representatives of companies 
sometimes also prefer a swifter conclusion to a case to minimize the 
reputational risks to their corporation which prolonged media exposure may 
cause.”129 The OECD Working Group identified the issue of penalty notices as 
                                                 
126http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/netherlandsmustsignificantlystepupitsforeignbriberyenforcementsaysoecd.htm   
127 http://thebriberyact.com/2014/12/12/the-corruption-enforcement-view-from-norway-by-frode-
elgesem/    
128 OECD Working Group on Bribery, “Phase 3 Report on implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention in Norway”, June 2011, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/Norwayphase3reportEN.pdf    
129 Ibid. Para 64   
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one they needed to follow up noting that Norway had no “prosecutorial 
guidelines or guidance from the courts” with regard to their use.  
In January 2014, Yara – a Norwegian fertilizer firm 36% owned by the 
Norwegian government – was fined $48.5 million by way of a penalty notice for 
paying bribes in Libya, Russia and India. Yara, which uncovered and reported 
the bribes, admitted guilt, and the former CEO who was in charge at the time 
and 3 members of his senior management team have subsequently been 
prosecuted and convicted in July 2015. Very little detail was made public about 
the facts of the case.  
Prior to the Yara case, Okokrim had issued three penalty notices against 
companies for foreign bribery including in the Statoil case, where the Norwegian 
oil company was fined $3 million initially for bribery but later for trading in 
influence. In one case, the company refused to accept the penalty notice and 
the case went to the Court of Appeal where the penalty notice was upheld.130  
While Norway scores highly on bringing individuals to account and 
requiring admission of guilt while entering into out of court settlements, it has 
little transparency in its penalty notices, the use of which protects companies 
from debarment under the EU Directives which require a final court order as the 
basis for debarment.  
 
3.3 Italian Pattegiamentos  
 
In Italy, all foreign bribery enforcement actions taken to date against 
companies have been under the patteggiamento system, which is a form of plea 
bargain.131 Italian judges oversee a patteggiamento and exercise control over 
whether it is accepted or not. A patteggiamento allows for a one third reduction 
in penalty, possibility of receiving a suspension of the sentence, possibility of an 
‘extinction’ of the offence after 5 years if no other offences are committed by the 
                                                 
130 OECD Working Group on Bribery, “Norway: Follow up to Phase 3 Report and 
Recommendations”, July 2013, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/NorwayP3WrittenFollowUp_EN.pdf    
131OECD Working Group on Bribery, “Phase 3 Report on implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention in Italy”, December 2011, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/Italyphase3reportEN.pd     
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company or individual, and the avoidance of additional sanctions (such as 
debarment). While patteggiamentos are overseen by a judge, little information 
appears to be made public, and to get access to the court ruling, an individual 
or organization has to prove its ‘interest’.  
In 2011 the OECD Working Group on Bribery recommended that Italy 
make public as much as possible the terms of a patteggiamento including the 
reason as to why it was appropriate. In 2014, the Working Group found that Italy 
had not made any effort to do so.132 A patteggiamento generally requires no 
admission of guilt. Agusta Westland’s UK subsidiary for instance entered into a 
patteggiamento in Italy in August 2014, which it explained in its annual report for 
that year was “neither an affirmation of liability, nor an acceptance of guilt.” 
Agusta Westland SpA was fined €80,000 while the UK subsidiary Agusta 
Westland Ltd, was fined €300,000 and had €7.5 million confiscated.  
Thus, while Italian patteggiamento’s are overseen by a judge there is 
little transparency about the terms of the agreement, and agreements 
specifically protect companies from debarment. Furthermore, fines have been 
very low and actions against individuals have tended to either be insignificant or 
dropped. However, the OECD noted that Italy’s use of patteggiamentos needs 
to be seen in the context of a large number of cases (22 out of 29) being 
dropped under the Italian legal system because they have become time-barred. 
In this context, patteggiamentos may, the OECD say, play the role of a ‘safety-
net’, getting companies to accept a fine before the low statute of limitations (6 
years) expires. 
 
3.4 Swiss Summary Punishment Orders  
 
The OECD Working Group on Bribery noted in its 2011 Phase 3 for 
Switzerland, that Switzerland had dealt with all cases of foreign bribery it has 
had to that date by means of a summary punishment order and or ‘Reparation’. 
Summary punishment orders are usually used for minor offences in Switzerland 
                                                 
132 OECD Working Group on Bribery, Italy: Follow-up to the Phase 3 Report and 
Recommendations, May 2014, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/ItalyP3WrittenFollowUpReportEN.pdf    
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that do not merit a penalty of longer than 6 months imprisonment. Under such 
an order, the prosecutor and the offender agree a penalty, in exchange for the 
offender recognizing the facts in the charge brought against it. Under a 
‘Reparation’ meanwhile, the defendant is exempt from liability once it has made 
all efforts as can reasonably be expected to compensate the wrongdoing. 
Reparations should, according to statute, only be used where there is little 
public interest or little interest by the injured party in bringing a prosecution. 
Switzerland dealt with both Alstom and a Swedish subsidiary of Siemens, 
SIT,133 by way of ‘Reparation’.  
There is little transparency with regard to summary punishment orders 
which are confidential unless someone can prove a legitimate interest in 
viewing it. Prosecutors are not required to state the reasons for using a 
summary punishment order nor provide details for how a fine is calculated. The 
OECD Working Group on Bribery recognized that this was an issue affecting 
other parties to the Convention, but recommended that the authorities make 
public the reasons for using a summary punishment order, ‘reparation’ or 
simplified procedure, the basis for the decision, and the sanctions involved.134  
 
3.5 Danish Out of Court Settlements  
 
Denmark has resolved just one case of foreign bribery cases by means 
of an out of court settlement or penalty notice. Under the Danish Administration 
of Justice Act, a prosecutor can impose a penalty notice with a specified fine. It 
is not a requirement of these notices that companies self-report or cooperate 
and there is little transparency. Officials from SOIK, the Danish Serious 
Economic and International Crime Public Prosecutor, told the OECD that it was 
‘self-evident’ that there would be less transparency in an out of court settlement 
                                                 
133 https://www.news.admin.ch/message/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=50913    
134 OECD Working Group on Bribery, “Phase 3 report on implementing the Anti-Bribery 
Convention in Switzerland”, December 2011: http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/Switzerlandphase3reportEN.pdf    
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since the purpose of these settlements was “to end the prosecution in a more 
silent way.”135  
The OECD Working Group on Bribery concluded, in similar wording to its 
criticism of the civil recovery process in the UK, that the settlement process in 
Denmark is “opaque, lacks accountability and thus fails to instill public and 
judicial confidence.” The OECD also urged Denmark to develop a clear 
framework for such settlements and ensure that individuals were also 
prosecuted.  
A legislative amendment in 2014 allowed the public to request 
information about a penalty notice in a settlement, but the OECD noted that 
since the public is not informed about settlements it would not be in a position to 
require such information. Denmark had taken no further steps to develop a 
framework for such settlements.136  
 
3.6 German Administrative Procedures  
 
 Germany is an unusual and complex case because although it ranks 
second behind the US in proactive enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
convention and has brought a significant number of actions against companies 
and individuals, German law does not provide for criminal liability. Between 
2005 and 2013, six legal entities were sanctioned for corruption under 
administrative law (although a criminal court can order the participation of a 
company in criminal proceedings against an individual), and 141 individuals 
sanctioned through a mix of criminal law and through a procedure whereby 
charges are dismissed (the OECD Working Group on Bribery has raised 
concerns about this procedure and noted that the majority of individual penalties 
                                                 
135 OECD Working Group on Bribery, “Phase 3 report on implementing the Anti-Bribery 
Convention in Denmark”, March 2013, para 81, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/denmark-
oecdanti-briberyconvention.htm    
136 OECD Working Group on Bribery, “Denmark: Follow up to the Phase 3 Report and 
Recommendations”, May 2015, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Denmark-Phase-3-Written-
Follow-Up-Report-EN.pdf    
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have involved suspended sentences, while corporate fines have generally been 
low).137  
A recent introduction under the German Criminal Procedure Code allows 
negotiated sentencing agreements which can be used for companies ordered to 
participate in criminal proceedings. Such agreements require a confession from 
the defendant and that the prosecutor must present the same level of evidence 
as in a full trial. The OECD Working Group on Bribery stated that it would be 
monitoring its use.  
 
Conclusions  
 
Various European countries, which generally represent a low 
enforcement environment on foreign bribery offences, have tended to use out of 
court settlements or some related procedure as a quick route to achieving fines 
against companies for foreign bribery offences. The OECD Working Group on 
Bribery has consistently raised concerns about this practice, whether there is a 
suitable legal or other framework in place to govern such settlements, whether 
there is any transparency in these settlements, whether sanctions are 
sufficiently high under such settlements, and whether individuals are being 
prosecuted.  
What is very clear is that by using out of court settlements European 
countries are effectively helping their companies avoid the provisions of 
mandatory exclusion from debarment in the EU Procurement Directives. 
Although out of court settlements may help these countries increase their 
enforcement figures on paper, it is highly questionable whether they are likely to 
have a real deterrent effect if they continue to shield companies from 
debarment, fail to hold individuals to account, lack transparency and fail to 
achieve significant penalties.  
 
                                                 
137 OECD Working Group on Bribery, “Germany: Follow up to the Phase 3 Report and 
Recommendations”, April 2013, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/GermanyPhase3WrittenFollowUpEN.pdf    
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Global standards for the use of corporate settlements are increasingly 
essential. The UN Conference of State Parties has already commissioned work 
on collecting information on and analyzing settlements with a view to developing 
guidelines for return of assets from settlements to affected states. The World 
Bank and UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative 
have also made recommendations for how such recovery and greater 
participation of affected states can be achieved.  
The OECD Working Group on Bribery which provides proactive 
monitoring of State Parties enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
needs to undertake a similar exercise looking at the deterrent effect of 
settlements. It also needs to develop guidelines for best practice in the use of 
settlements to help create a more even enforcement playing field. The lessons 
learned in looking at the decade of US experience of using such settlements, 
the emerging experience from the UK and the use of out of court settlements in 
Europe suggest some important principles that could form the basis for such 
guidelines.  
The purpose of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is itself at stake. If 
settlements continue to be used in a way that lacks transparency, leaves 
individuals responsible for wrongdoing unpunished, and shields companies from 
debarment, it is questionable whether the fight against foreign bribery can 
ultimately succeed. 
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